Found some interesting articles concerning China and India...
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China-passes-off-fake-drugs-as-Made-in-India/articleshow/4633377.cms
(Chinese passing off fake drugs as Made in India!!)
http://business.rediff.com/slide-show/2009/jun/25/slide-show-1-how-to-spot-fake-notes.htm
(Fake notes in India. Surely made by a collaboration between China and Pakistan)
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,829540,00.html
(Brilliant article on the India-China war with a lot of information on how Nehru crippled India in the lead up to it)
http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/07/a_uighur_speaks_about_pork.php
(What the Chinese do to the minorities)
Showing posts with label Nehru. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nehru. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
The Nehru legacy - brainwashing the public
Found a very good piece in LK Advani's website which gives very good information on how the Congress has worked to influence Indian minds and brainwash them so that they think that it is only the Gandhi-Nehru family which contributed anything for India!
It only goes to show that Indian never really got its freedom and what happened on August 15th was merely the passing of the Baton from the brits to the Nehru family. The way the congress thinks it owns India while itself being ruled by the Nehru family clearly shows that India is struggling to get itself out of the monarchy minset.
All in the name of the Nehru Gandhi Family
- Surya Prakash
1. BUILDING BRAND CONGRESS WITH PUBLIC MONEY
In a planned and systematic effort to gain unfair advantage over other political parties, the Congress Party has named all major government programmes, projects and institutions in the country after three members of the Nehru-Gandhi family - Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru – who are its icons, and disturbed the level playing field in the electoral arena.
2. WHERE IS THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD?
Such is the obsession of the Congress Party with three members of the Nehru-Gandhi family that even the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi has been virtually forgotten. The Congress Party’s contempt for Mahatma Gandhi is best explained by the fact that just one central scheme – the Mahatma Gandhi Backward Region Development Fund- has been named after him. Even this tokenism has come as an after thought only in 2007, almost 60 years after the Mahatma’s assassination. On the other hand, schemes to promote rural electrification, drinking water, crèche for children and micro and small industries in rural areas ( each of which was close to the heart of the Mahatma) are all named after Rajiv Gandhi. Again, the scheme to build houses for the rural poor (something that would have made the Mahatma proud) is named after Indira Gandhi, as also the national old age pension scheme. Yet another programme which ought to have been named after the Mahatma - the greatest Indian of the 20 th Century- is the Rozgar Yojana which guarantees 100 days of work for the rural unemployed all over the country. Even this programme was initially named after Jawaharlal Nehru as also the Urban Renewal Mission (annual budgetary allocation of over Rs 10,000 Crores).
3. LIST OF THE 450 SCHEMES
Inside is the list of Government Schemes and Projects; Universities and Educational Institutions; Ports and Airports; National Parks and Sanctuaries; Sports Tournaments, Trophies and Stadia; Hospitals and Medical Institutions; National Scientific and Research Institutions; University Chairs, Scholarships and Fellowships; Festivals; Roads and Buildings named after three member of the Nehru Gandhi family viz. Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, which has been submitted to the Election Commission by A.Surya Prakash as an Annexure to his complaint. This list includes most of the projects, schemes and institutions funded by the Union Government and the Governments in the States.
It only goes to show that Indian never really got its freedom and what happened on August 15th was merely the passing of the Baton from the brits to the Nehru family. The way the congress thinks it owns India while itself being ruled by the Nehru family clearly shows that India is struggling to get itself out of the monarchy minset.
All in the name of the Nehru Gandhi Family
- Surya Prakash
1. BUILDING BRAND CONGRESS WITH PUBLIC MONEY
In a planned and systematic effort to gain unfair advantage over other political parties, the Congress Party has named all major government programmes, projects and institutions in the country after three members of the Nehru-Gandhi family - Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru – who are its icons, and disturbed the level playing field in the electoral arena.
2. WHERE IS THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD?
Such is the obsession of the Congress Party with three members of the Nehru-Gandhi family that even the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi has been virtually forgotten. The Congress Party’s contempt for Mahatma Gandhi is best explained by the fact that just one central scheme – the Mahatma Gandhi Backward Region Development Fund- has been named after him. Even this tokenism has come as an after thought only in 2007, almost 60 years after the Mahatma’s assassination. On the other hand, schemes to promote rural electrification, drinking water, crèche for children and micro and small industries in rural areas ( each of which was close to the heart of the Mahatma) are all named after Rajiv Gandhi. Again, the scheme to build houses for the rural poor (something that would have made the Mahatma proud) is named after Indira Gandhi, as also the national old age pension scheme. Yet another programme which ought to have been named after the Mahatma - the greatest Indian of the 20 th Century- is the Rozgar Yojana which guarantees 100 days of work for the rural unemployed all over the country. Even this programme was initially named after Jawaharlal Nehru as also the Urban Renewal Mission (annual budgetary allocation of over Rs 10,000 Crores).
3. LIST OF THE 450 SCHEMES
Inside is the list of Government Schemes and Projects; Universities and Educational Institutions; Ports and Airports; National Parks and Sanctuaries; Sports Tournaments, Trophies and Stadia; Hospitals and Medical Institutions; National Scientific and Research Institutions; University Chairs, Scholarships and Fellowships; Festivals; Roads and Buildings named after three member of the Nehru Gandhi family viz. Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, which has been submitted to the Election Commission by A.Surya Prakash as an Annexure to his complaint. This list includes most of the projects, schemes and institutions funded by the Union Government and the Governments in the States.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Chinese atrocity in Tibet
There was a very disturbing video on rediff today showing the brutal atrocities committed on innocent Tibetan people.
http://ishare.rediff.com/filevideo.php?id=592894
I have many chinese friends that I have spoken to about the communist government and Tibet and most if not all support the Chinese action and merely parrot the official government version calling the Dalai Lama and the tibetans "seccesionist" "rioters" "we have liberated them from the Dalai lama" and other similar bull shit. It was some satisfaction that I managed to defeated them in debate and sort of was able to get a few of them to think beyond what their government brainwashed them with.
But then consider what the Chinese authorities do to their own people!!
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090317/ap_on_re_us/as_china_tainted_milk
"Families whose children fell ill from tainted milk have come under pressure to drop compensation lawsuits, victims' advocates said Tuesday, showing the government's lingering uneasiness over one of China's worst contamination scandals.
Local officials were calling and visiting at least a half-dozen families, urging them to drop their cases against the dairies and accept a government-sanctioned compensation plan giving 2,000 yuan ($290) to most victims, said Zhao Lianhai, the father of a child sickened by the milk."
I think it is important to remember how Jawahar Lal Nehru, out first Prime Minister betrayed the Tibetan people and India by not doing anything and even actually supporting the Chinese "liberation" of Tibet!! It is common knowledge that Nehru was a communist and for him this was just another step in the ineveitable spread of communism. His statements supporting Stalins murdeous regime as well known.
This letter sent to Nehru by Sardar Patel requires reading in this context.
"My dear Jawaharlal,
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.
In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.
Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.
Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengar to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.
It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.
a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat.
d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.
These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.
I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.
Vallabhbhai Patel, 7th November 1950
http://ishare.rediff.com/filevideo.php?id=592894
I have many chinese friends that I have spoken to about the communist government and Tibet and most if not all support the Chinese action and merely parrot the official government version calling the Dalai Lama and the tibetans "seccesionist" "rioters" "we have liberated them from the Dalai lama" and other similar bull shit. It was some satisfaction that I managed to defeated them in debate and sort of was able to get a few of them to think beyond what their government brainwashed them with.
But then consider what the Chinese authorities do to their own people!!
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090317/ap_on_re_us/as_china_tainted_milk
"Families whose children fell ill from tainted milk have come under pressure to drop compensation lawsuits, victims' advocates said Tuesday, showing the government's lingering uneasiness over one of China's worst contamination scandals.
Local officials were calling and visiting at least a half-dozen families, urging them to drop their cases against the dairies and accept a government-sanctioned compensation plan giving 2,000 yuan ($290) to most victims, said Zhao Lianhai, the father of a child sickened by the milk."
I think it is important to remember how Jawahar Lal Nehru, out first Prime Minister betrayed the Tibetan people and India by not doing anything and even actually supporting the Chinese "liberation" of Tibet!! It is common knowledge that Nehru was a communist and for him this was just another step in the ineveitable spread of communism. His statements supporting Stalins murdeous regime as well known.
This letter sent to Nehru by Sardar Patel requires reading in this context.
"My dear Jawaharlal,
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.
In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.
Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.
Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengar to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.
It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.
a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat.
d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.
These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.
I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.
Vallabhbhai Patel, 7th November 1950
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Shyam Prasad Mukherjee
The chief founder of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, S.P. Mukherjee was an ardent patriot and nationalistic political leader of India. It is unfortunate that none of the educated youth have any idea about this great personality whose efforts made it possible for Kashmir to remain a part of India inspite of Nehru's inanities.
Mukherjee was firmly against Nehru's invitation to the Pakistani PM Liaquat Ali Khan, and their joint pact to establish minority commissions and guarantee minority rights in both countries. Under the pact the governments of Pakistan and India had no "extra-territorial claims" on the minorities of the other country. He wanted Pakistan to take direct responsibility for the terrible influx of millions of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan, who had left the state fearing religious suppression and violence aided by the state.
On April 19, 1950, he said
"When the partition of this country became inevitable I played a very large part in creating public opinion in favor of the partition of Bengal, for I felt that if that was not done, the whole of Bengal and also perhaps Assam would fall to Pakistan. At that time little knowing that I would jointhe first central cabinet, I along with others, gave assuarnaces to the Hindus of East Bengal stating that if they suffered at the hands of the future Paksitani government, if they were denied elementary rights of citizenship, if their lives and honour were not jeopardised or attacked, free India would not remain an idle spectator and their just cause would be boldly taken up by the government and people of India."
The Liaquat-Nehru pact violated Mukherjee's pledge to the Hindus of East Bengal and thus resigned from the cabinet and founded the Jana Sangh.
-The Jana Sangh by Craig Baxter, Pg 66
(The fears of Mukherjee was proven right as seen by the terrible atrocities committed on the hindu/buddhist minorites in Pakistan (incl. Bangaldesh)
e.g. http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=41,5734,0,0,1,0
http://www.angelfire.com/ab/jumma/refugee.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/11/protectingpakistanshindus
http://www.islam-watch.org/MarianaBaabar/HindusInPakistan.htm )
"The BJS criticized favoritism to India's Muslims by the Nehru administration, and promoted free-market economics as opposed to the socialism in Nehru's economic and social policies. The BJS also favored a uniform civil code for both Hindus and Muslims, want to ban cow slaughter and end the special status of Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir"
"Sri Mookerjee opposed the Indian National Congress's decision to allow Kashmir to be a special state and have its own flag and prime minister. According to Congress's decision, no one, including the President of India can enter into Kashmir with out the Kashmir's prime minister's approval.
In order to oppose this decision, he once said "Ek desh mein do Vidhan, do Prdhan and Do Nishan nahi chalenge" (A single country can't have two constitutions, two prime ministers, and two National Emblems)
Mookerjee went to visit Kashmir in 1953, and went on hunger strike to protest the law prohibiting Indian citizens from settling in a state in their own country and the need to carry ID cards, and was arrested on 11 May while crossing border. Although the ID card rule was revoked owing to his efforts, he died as detenu on May 23, 1953 under mysterious circumstances. His death in custody raised wide suspicion across the country and demands for independent enquiry, including earnest requests from his mother, Jogmaya Devi to the then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Unfortunately no enquiry commission was set up and his death remains a mystery."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syama_Prasad_Mookerjee
Shows the complicity of Nehru in finishing off anybody who opposed him. Another victim of Nehru's vindictiveness was the great Indian freedom fighter Shri V.D. Savarkar. But thats a story for another day.
Mukherjee was firmly against Nehru's invitation to the Pakistani PM Liaquat Ali Khan, and their joint pact to establish minority commissions and guarantee minority rights in both countries. Under the pact the governments of Pakistan and India had no "extra-territorial claims" on the minorities of the other country. He wanted Pakistan to take direct responsibility for the terrible influx of millions of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan, who had left the state fearing religious suppression and violence aided by the state.
On April 19, 1950, he said
"When the partition of this country became inevitable I played a very large part in creating public opinion in favor of the partition of Bengal, for I felt that if that was not done, the whole of Bengal and also perhaps Assam would fall to Pakistan. At that time little knowing that I would jointhe first central cabinet, I along with others, gave assuarnaces to the Hindus of East Bengal stating that if they suffered at the hands of the future Paksitani government, if they were denied elementary rights of citizenship, if their lives and honour were not jeopardised or attacked, free India would not remain an idle spectator and their just cause would be boldly taken up by the government and people of India."
The Liaquat-Nehru pact violated Mukherjee's pledge to the Hindus of East Bengal and thus resigned from the cabinet and founded the Jana Sangh.
-The Jana Sangh by Craig Baxter, Pg 66
(The fears of Mukherjee was proven right as seen by the terrible atrocities committed on the hindu/buddhist minorites in Pakistan (incl. Bangaldesh)
e.g. http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=41,5734,0,0,1,0
http://www.angelfire.com/ab/jumma/refugee.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/11/protectingpakistanshindus
http://www.islam-watch.org/MarianaBaabar/HindusInPakistan.htm )
"The BJS criticized favoritism to India's Muslims by the Nehru administration, and promoted free-market economics as opposed to the socialism in Nehru's economic and social policies. The BJS also favored a uniform civil code for both Hindus and Muslims, want to ban cow slaughter and end the special status of Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir"
"Sri Mookerjee opposed the Indian National Congress's decision to allow Kashmir to be a special state and have its own flag and prime minister. According to Congress's decision, no one, including the President of India can enter into Kashmir with out the Kashmir's prime minister's approval.
In order to oppose this decision, he once said "Ek desh mein do Vidhan, do Prdhan and Do Nishan nahi chalenge" (A single country can't have two constitutions, two prime ministers, and two National Emblems)
Mookerjee went to visit Kashmir in 1953, and went on hunger strike to protest the law prohibiting Indian citizens from settling in a state in their own country and the need to carry ID cards, and was arrested on 11 May while crossing border. Although the ID card rule was revoked owing to his efforts, he died as detenu on May 23, 1953 under mysterious circumstances. His death in custody raised wide suspicion across the country and demands for independent enquiry, including earnest requests from his mother, Jogmaya Devi to the then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Unfortunately no enquiry commission was set up and his death remains a mystery."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syama_Prasad_Mookerjee
Shows the complicity of Nehru in finishing off anybody who opposed him. Another victim of Nehru's vindictiveness was the great Indian freedom fighter Shri V.D. Savarkar. But thats a story for another day.
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